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Abstract 
 A number of landmark judicial review decisions and the resultant 
political backlash are arguably to supportive of the claim that 
political and legal constitutionalism are entrenched in South 
Africa. The common thread in the legislature and executive's 
reaction to judicial review decisions is that government 
supremacy is under threat from legal constitutionalism. More 
specifically, there is a perception that courts are meddling in the 
political space through judgments that are aimed at weakening 
the government's authority and power. Nonetheless, such 
decisions have had an effect of reinforcing the judiciary's legal 
constitutional role of reviewing the lawfulness of the other 
branches' activities. There is need for strategies to minimize this 
tension as the continued antagonism can have unintended 
consequences such as the delegitimisation of the judiciary. 
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1  Introduction 
Judging by myriad reports quoting fractious utterances by members of the 
ruling African National Congress party (ANC), it is safe to say that the recent 
coverage of acerbic political statements aimed at the judiciary signify a 
growing tension between the South African judiciary on one hand and 
legislature and the executive on the other.1 Several cases are illustrative of 
this assertion. Ultimately, the events surrounding these and many other 
cases discussed below had the effect of pitting those who argued that the 
issues were political and those who saw a need for judicial involvement. At 
the heart of this conflict is a debate between the starkly underlying politically 
motivated system of governance and of the constitutionally entrenched 
rights of the judiciary. For the purpose of this comment, it is the arguments 
proffered for and against the use of judicial review to resolve the contentious 
issues that are illuminating. The judgments handed down by the courts have 
brought into focus an arguably unsteady Executive-Legislative-Judicial 
relationship. 
This scenario has presented an ample opportunity for re-examining the 
divergent theories surrounding constitutionalism in South Africa. Earlier 
scholarship has emphasized the need to broaden political debate on this 
subject with a view to reviving "serious interest in issues of deference and 
the separation of powers".2 In fact, the issue of the conflict between the 
judiciary and the other arms of the State is one in which much ink has been 
spilt.3 To a cynic this is an exhausted issue and would not warrant any 
additional scholarly consideration. However, maintaining such an attitude 
arguably smacks of complacency and is counterproductive to 
constitutionalism and good governance. Continued attention on this issue is 
                                            
*  Herbert Kawadza. PhD (Manchester) LLM (London) PGCE (Manchester Met), LLB 
Hons (University of Zimbabwe). Senior Lecturer, School of Law, the University of the 
Witwatersrand, South Africa. E-mail: Herbert.kawadza@wits.ac.za. 
1  Recent years have seen a number of important court decisions going against the 
ANC led government. Most of these had an effect of cementing freedoms enshrined 
in the Constitution, but surprisingly, such outcomes have not been accepted without 
vilification by the Executive. In other instances government simply ignored the court 
orders. See for example Primedia Broadcasting, A Division of Primedia (Pty) Ltd v 
Speaker of the National Assembly 2015 4 SA 525 (WCC); Freedom under Law v 
Acting Chairperson: Judicial Service Commission 2011 3 SA 549 (SCA); Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation Centre 
2016 ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016). 
2  Democratic Governance and Rights Unit 2014 http://www.dgru. 
uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/103/Separation%20of%20Powers%
20Draft%20August%202014.pdf 5. See also a similar exhortation by Hoexter 
Administrative Law 519. 
3  See among others Vinx 2010 Political Theory 809; Hirschl 2006 Fordham L Rev 721; 
Walen 2009 ICON 329; Hickman 2005 U Toronto LJ 981; Honohan "Republicans, 
Rights, and Constitutions"83. 
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crucial and as Malila contends, it is "fitting that with the emerging trends, the 
importance of the independence of the judiciary in the systems of checks 
and balances … is repeatedly examined and re-examined".4 Furthermore, 
the crucial social,5 economic6 and political7 implications of constitutionalism 
make it imperative that discussion on this debate be kept alive. Unlike other 
submissions however, this discussion aims to contribute to the scholarship 
that has sought to situate that antagonism within the South African context. 
Through a panoramic interpretation of the political responses to judicial 
review judgments this comment seeks to make a modest attempt at 
exposing and revisiting the political and legal constitutionalism discourse 
that have spurred by such events. 
This comment does not intend to dwell on the correctness or otherwise of 
the substantive reasoning behind the judgments but rather on their 
implications in this discussion. To that end, this article proceeds as follows. 
The second section gives a background to the legal and political 
constitutionalism theories and reviews the inherently non-complementary or 
incompatible central components of the two systems. Section three 
positions these concepts within the South African context. It accomplishes 
that by making reference to some of the cases whose outcomes illustrate 
the deep-seated legitimacy conflict in the trilateral relationship. It also briefly 
discusses the possible consequences emanating from that those hostilities. 
Section four concludes. 
2  Political and legal constitutionalism revisited 
Simply described, the main objective of constitutionalism is the prevention 
of arbitrary governance.8 This is achieved by way of elaborate structures 
that establish who can rule, the technique of ruling as well as the purpose.9 
From this established theory two contrasting models – legal and political 
constitutionalism – have emerged. These two schools of thought differ in 
terms of their characterisation of what amounts to arbitrary conduct and the 
resultant strategies that are aimed at averting the perceived threats to basic 
tenets of constitutionalism. 
                                            
4  Malila 2011 Zambia LJ 72. 
5  See generally Goldoni 2012 ICON 926; Dani 2009 http://www.lse.ac.uk/european-
institute/Assets/Documents/LEQS-Discussion-Papers/LEQSPaper13b.pdf; Sciulli 
Theory of Societal Constitutionalism. 
6  See for instance Gerber 2001 JITE 14; Feiyue 2006 Front Law China 372; Dawson, 
Enderlein and Joerges Beyond the Crisis. 
7  Shinar Accidental Constitutionalism; Bellamy Political Constitutionalism; Tushnet 
2006 Chi-Kent L Rev 992.  
8  Arato 2012 ICON 627-659; Cohen "Sovereignty in the Context of Globalization" 261. 
9  See for instance Horowitz "Constitutional Design" 15-36.  
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The political constitution theory is premised on the notion that political 
processes should be mechanism through which those who exercise political 
power should be subjected to. In essence it provides that alleged violations 
of political codes or norms should be subjected to political processes10; that 
"political decisions should be taken by politicians",11 that "no political matter 
may be decided other than by the people, lest that matter (no matter how 
obvious or true or right) becomes a source of domination over the people".12 
Adherents claim that accountability is facilitated not by the depoliticising 
efforts of the judiciary but by mechanisms such as elections and other 
motivation that compel politicians to make judgments that benefit the 
electorate.13 Since political matters require political remedies the judiciary 
has no room to adjudicate on such issues. The argument is that judicial 
involvement would result in the "juridification" of political issues which would 
culminate in taking "political decisions out of the hands of politicians and 
into the hands of judges".14 
By contrast, proponents of legal constitutionalism submit that judicial review 
and not political mechanisms should be the tool for holding those exercising 
political power to account.15 They perceive "political life as potentially 
destructive of the rule of law and individual rights and which, therefore, must 
be constrained by judicially enforceable constitutional prescriptions".16 What 
seems to be the building block of legal constitutionalism is that the judicial 
process is more reliable and fairer than the democratic process. It is argued, 
among other things, that the judiciary is able isolate itself from public 
pressure.17 Furthermore, it is submitted that through judicial review, not only 
is the sanctity of the Constitution preserved but the fundamental rights of 
individuals are also secured.18 More recent legal constitutional scholars 
such as Tomkins advance the concept of "juristocracy" by which they argue 
that all constitutional problems can be resolved by the judiciary and in fact, 
                                            
10  Gee and Webber 2010 OJLS 273; Griffith 1979 MLR 1-2; Waldron 2006 Yale LJ 
1346. 
11  Griffith 1979 MLR 2. For additional attacks on the alternative scholarship see for 
instance Honohan "Republicans, Rights, and Constitutions" 83; Craig "Political 
Constitutionalism and Judicial Review" 19; Vinx 2010 Political Theory 809; Walen 
2009 ICON 329; Hickman 2005 U Toronto LJ 981. 
12  Gee and Webber 2010 OJLS 273. 
13  See Bellamy Political Constitutionalism. 
14  Griffith 1979 MLR 16. 
15  Gee and Webber 2010 OJLS 273; Carbonell Theory of New Constitutionalism; 
Hirschl 2006 Fordham L Rev 721  
16  Gee and Webber 2010 OJLS 279-280. 
17  See generally Bellamy Political Constitutionalism. 
18  Moseneke 2012 SALJ 17. See also Budlender 2011 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-budlender-address-by-human-rights-lawyer-at-
the-bram-fischermemorial-lecture-johannesburg-11112011-2011-11-11. 
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that it is inconceivable that a constitutional problem can be said to be surely 
straighten out until the courts have solved it.19 
Nonetheless, political constitutionalists argue that  
… when it comes to making decisions about our collective life, constitutional 
courts…lack the intrinsic fairness and impartiality of the democratic process – 
that of treating each person's views equally. They restrict access and unduly 
narrow the range of arguments and remedies that may be considered, and 
are neither accountable nor responsive to citizens in ways that ensure their 
opinions and interests receive equal concern and respect.20 
Furthermore, litigation  
… is a time consuming business, with constitutional courts perforce having to 
be highly selective as to which cases they hear. When they do so, the case is 
presented as a dispute between two litigants and the only persons and 
arguments with standing have to relate to the points of law that have been 
raised by those concerned.21 
Much as these schools of thought depict divergent foundational tenets 
which in turn make diverse requirements on the political and judicial actors, 
in the final analysis they all converge on their acceptance of the fact that the 
Constitution is higher law which invalidates all other laws that stand in 
conflict with it.22 
3  The South African setting 
In South Africa recognition was given to the fact  
… that untrammelled parliamentary authority was vulnerable to abuse, and 
that this should be guarded against by entrenching certain rights against 
legislative interference. Once this decision was made, institutional 
arrangements had to be made in order to police the boundaries for legislative 
and executive conduct which had been created by the constitution. This role 
was given to the courts.23 
                                            
19  Tomkins 2010 U Toronto LJ 1. See also Craig 2011 ICON 112-131. 
20  European Commission for Democracy through Law Definition and Development of 
Human Rights 81. 
21  Bellamy 2007 https://www.ucl.ac.uk/spp/research/publications/downloads/SPP-WP-
26-Inaugural-Lecture.pdf. 
22  In South Africa s 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides 
that: "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or conduct 
inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled." 
Related to this is s 8, providing that all law is subject to the Bill of Rights and that the 
same binds the Legislature, the Executive, the Judiciary and all state organs. 
23  Democratic Governance and Rights Unit 2014 
http://www.dgru.uct.ac.za/sites/default/files/image_tool/images/103/Separation%20
of%20Powers%20Draft%20August%202014.pdf. See also Klug 2010 CCR 1; Van 
Zyl 2009 PELJ 2. 
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More specifically, "Courts are required by the Constitution 'to ensure that all 
branches of government act within the law' and fulfil their constitutional 
obligations. This Court 'has been given the responsibility of being the 
ultimate guardian of the Constitution and its values".24As such judicial 
intrusion into the political realm is provided for under the constitution. 
Ironically, it is that constitutional mandate itself that has driven the courts to 
the rough end of the political stick. This is mainly, as shown above, that role 
often times entails thwarting or declaring unconstitutional Legislative-
Executive decisions courts. As such the judiciary is denounced for 
supposedly fashioning their judgments with the objective of advancing or 
collusion with other entrenched interests. What emerge below are 
undertones of an unfolding conflict between legal and political 
constitutionalism.  
3.1  The trend 
After a long period of dormancy, South Africa is witnessing a resurgence of 
the legal and political constitutionalism controversy.25 Recent years have 
been associated with increased negative reports, complaints and stirring 
emotional statements by the ANC government against the judiciary. It is 
worth noting that much of the contestation follows a rise in cases that were 
capable of and indeed should have been resolved politically.26 That the 
courts got embroiled in such cases should not be surprising. Judicial 
involvement was a mere confirmation of the natural order of things; people 
fall back on the judiciary when disputes are not resolved, just as they rely 
on the electoral system to get rid of politicians.27 
As will be shown below, a common thread in these attacks is what is 
perceived as judicial invasion into the political domain. The contention is 
that, using judicial review as a tool; courts are meddling in the political space 
through judgments that are designed at chipping off the government's 
                                            
24  Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly 2006 6 SA 416 
(CC) para 38.  
25  It is recorded that this trend was last seen in the 1950s. See Van Zyl 2009 PELJ 3 
and the authorities cited thereat. See also Siyo et al 2015 PELJ 816. This is further 
supported by Klaaren who notes that "Since at least around 2003, the judiciary and 
the government had been engaged in seriously negotiating a set of rules and 
principles regarding the institution of the judiciary … This was the case at least until 
late 2005 and 2006, when the issue spilled into public debate". See Klaaren 2009 
http://wiredspace.wits.ac.za/jspui/bitstream/10539/8749/1/Hlophe%20and%20the%
20Politics%20of%20the%20Judiciary.pdf. See also Albertyn 2006 SAJHR 126. 
26  See Business Day 12 July, Mail & Guardian 19 August, The Times 2 November, City 
Press 18 December 2011, Business Day, The Times 16 March, The New Age 27 
March 2012.  
27  See Vibert New Regulatory Space. 
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authority and powers. It is feared that the continued intrusion might blur the 
lines that separate the judiciary from the legislature and Executive. Political 
constitutionalism, especially the alleged supremacy of the political system 
over the courts is best manifested through a number of statements by 
government ministers and the ANC's spokespeople. 
Several acerbic statements stand out in this regard. For instance in a show 
of displeasure after losing two major cases in the Constitutional Court28 - 
the then secretary general of the ANC, Gwede Mantashe lashed at the 
courts for "acting as if they were the political opposition' and in so doing 
seeking to arrest the functioning of Government".29 In another explicit 
display of discontentment with the judiciary, the secretary general of the 
South African Communist Party (SACP), an alliance of the ruling party, 
Blade Nzimande ranted that South Africa was slowly gravitating towards a 
"judicial dictatorship" manifested through "a co-ordinated liberal offensive" 
aimed at attacking "almost any decision by the president and the 
executive".30 
Probably the clearest indicator of the government's aversion of judicial 
review is best summarised by the President of the Republic of South Africa 
Mr Zuma who, in March 2012 is alleged have said: "We are a Government 
… and the Judiciary is not a government and it cannot simply review all 
government policies. They cannot be elevated to do something they are not 
supposed to do".31 
Of the many incidences32 that embody the hostilities towards the judiciary, 
several land mark cases are illustrative. In a criminal case33 before the 
                                            
28  These essentially centred on the challenge by Hugh Glenister to the scrapping of the 
Scorpions as well as actions instituted to prevent Mr Zuma from reappointing Judge 
Sandile Ngcobo as chief justice. See Glenister v President of the Republic of South 
Africa 2011 3 SA 347 (CC). 
29  Gumede Restless Nation; Hartley 2011 https://www.pressreader.com/south-
africa/business-day/20111102/282480000577522. See also Legalbrief Today 2011 
http://legalbrief.co.za/diary/legalbrief-today/story/zuma-lays-down-law-on-
separation-of-powers/print/. 
30  News24 2011 http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/Politics/Nzimande-slams-
judicial-dictatorship-20111217-2. 
31  News24 2011 http://m.news24.com/news24/SouthAfrica/Politics/Nzimande-slams-
judicial-dictatorship-20111217-2. 
32  This article does not seek to revisit all the cases that have exposed this conflict. 
Other cases include S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC); Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2001 1 SA 46 (CC); Minister of Health v 
Treatment Action Campaign 2002 5 SA 721 (CC). 
33  Freedom under Law v Acting Chairperson: Judicial Service Commission 2011 3 SA 
549 (SCA). 
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Constitutional Court involving the then deputy president Mr Jacob Zuma and 
another accused, it later alleged that before judgment was handed down 
Hlophe JP, separately approached some of the judges of the Constitutional 
Court with a view to influencing the pending judgment. Subsequently, this 
was reported to the other judges of the Constitutional Court and a complaint 
was against lodged to the Judicial Service Commission (JSC).34 Not content 
with the JSC's adverse findings, Mantshe made a scathing criticism of the 
judgment which he characterised as a conspiracy by "counter-revolutionary 
forces" bent on destroying the ruling party.35 
To clearly put these averments in perspective and understand the hostilities, 
a quick review of a few landmark cases is necessary. Perhaps the case that 
serves as an apt demonstration of resistance against constitutional court 
decisions and the fact that the judiciary sometimes fails to rely on the 
allegiance of political partners to be in order to have their decisions 
enforced36 is Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The 
Southern African Litigation Centre.37 
Following public outcry after the government defied the Rome Statute 
ordering the arrest and detention of President Al Bashir of Sudan for 
extensive human rights violations in his country, the government chose to 
cover up its inaction by portraying itself as a victim in the whole saga. The 
spin to the "who" debacle was that there was "a drive in sections of the 
judiciary to create chaos for governance; that's our view … you always see 
that the narrative is totally negative and create a contradiction".38 Similarly, 
the Minister of Higher Education Nzimande seethed that "sections of the 
judiciary tend to somehow overreach into areas that one would expect even 
in a constitutional state to tread very, very carefully".39 
                                            
34  For a background to this case and the subsequent academic discussion arising 
therefrom see S v Zuma 2006 2 SACR 191 (W); Hlophe v Constitutional Court of 
South Africa 2008 ZAGPHC 289 (25 September 2008); Dodek 2009 JPPL 121. 
35  Letsoalo, Rossouw and Alcock 2008 https://mg.co.za/article/2008-07-04-anc-boss-
accuses-judges-of-conspiracy-against-zuma. 
36  See also Mendes 2010 CCR 33. 
37  Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development v The Southern African Litigation 
Centre 2016 ZASCA 17 (15 March 2016). 
38  Comrie 2015 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Gwede-Mantashe-
singles-out-problematic-courts-20150622; Britton 2015 http://702.co.za/articles/ 
3355/gwede-mantashe-the-judiciary-has-anti-government-tendencies; eNCA 2015 
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/gwede-mantashe-criticises-judiciary-being-
problematic. 
39  Comrie 2015 https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Gwede-Mantashe-
singles-out-problematic-courts-20150622; Britton 2015 http://702.co.za/articles/ 
3355/gwede-mantashe-the-judiciary-has-anti-government-tendencies; eNCA 2015 
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3.2  Remarks on the tension 
The empirical accounts of hostilities towards the judiciary echo the view that 
legal constitutionalism is a threat to the political hegemony. With a view to 
countering that phenomenon, the political response has been a nuanced 
attempt towards the politicisation of the judiciary. This takes the form of 
"subtle threats and intimidation of judicial officers to force them into making 
findings favourable to certain political players".40 In other words, it is 
manifested by a "growing perception of the court as a partisan and possibly 
a coopted decision making body instead of an impartial and independent 
arbiter of conflicts".41 
The foregoing also validates the commonly held hypothesis that 
"constitutional adjudication has traditionally been regarded as 'political'; 
identifying how judicial decisions, especially those originating in the context 
of constitutional review, are referred to as 'political' as opposed to 'legal' or 
the like".42 As such, judicial review is deemed to be an intrusion into the 
political space and a negation of the assumption that other than political 
constitutionalism there is no space for any other superior norms or legal 
constitutions. 
However, that hypothesis only serves to expose lack of appreciation of the 
reality that law and politics are intertwined.43 It is also a failure to 
acknowledge that judicial detachment to avoid conflict is "impossible of 
achievement therefore it ought not to be strived for".44 Such ignorance 
arguably explains why, instead of simply complying with or appealing 
against unfavourable rulings, the government has sought to portray itself as 
a victim and as such, seek a realignment of the judiciary.45 
However in spite of such political denunciation it must be borne in mind - to 
the chagrin of political constitutionalists; that the judiciary will be expected 
to continue undeterred, to invalidate negative government policies or 
actions on constitutional grounds.46 The reality therefore is that "[w]here the 
courts are granted jurisdiction under the Constitution, they cannot decline 
                                            
https://www.enca.com/south-africa/gwede-mantashe-criticises-judiciary-being-
problematic. 
40  Malila 2011 Zambia LJ 126.  
41  Ciencia "From Judicialization to Politicization of the Judiciary" 118. 
42  Mendes 2010 CCR 34. 
43  Kurland 1959 Utah L Rev 457. 
44  Kurland 1959 Utah L Rev 464. 
45  See generally Hoexter 2000 SALJ 470; Van Zyl 2009 PELJ 2. 
46  See generally Van Zyl 2009 PELJ 2. 
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to intervene simply because there may be political consequences to the 
decision".47 
It is not as if the court itself is not aware of the dangers of intruding in the 
legislative and executive territories. The recent case of the Economic 
Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly48 exhibits a classic 
scenario of self-examination and a self-criticism that demonstrates that 
members of the judiciary are mindful of unwarranted judicial activism that 
seeks tramples on the separation of powers. In the dissenting judgment the 
Chief Justice of South Africa, Mogoeng Mogoeng expressed disquiet with 
the majority's directive that the Speaker of the House of Assembly 
implement necessary processes and mechanisms aimed holding the 
President Zuma accountable for his conduct (and failures) highlighted in the 
report of the Public Protector. 
In his admonishment to his fellow judges, he charged that the second 
judgment in particular had crossed the line, that it was "a textbook case of 
judicial overreach – a constitutionally impermissible intrusion by the 
Judiciary into the exclusive domain of Parliament".49 
As such, instead of condemning the dissenting judgment as other quarters 
of the society clearly did, the Chief Justice's response should be 
commended for its concern for the separation of powers. It should be 
celebrated for providing insights into the fact that the judiciary – by criticizing 
itself – is sensitive to the need avoid descending into the legislature's policy 
formulation and political arena. Likewise, wanton intrusion into the role of 
the legislature would have negative externalities of it undermining the 
"public faith in the objectivity and detachment of the Court, without which 
the Court will be reduced to an impotent body, unable to perform those 
important, indeed vital functions which properly fall within its scope".50 
Reiterating Kurland's warning Mogoeng Mogoeng counselled that the 
court's 
… impartiality must therefore never be open to reasonable doubt. For, its 
moral authority without which it would cease to enjoy legitimate public 
confidence and ready compliance with its decisions by all, owes its existence 
to its predictable and self-evident execution of its mandate without any 
apparent fear, favour or prejudice.51 
                                            
47  Okpaluba 2003 SAPR/PL 342. 
48  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 2 SA 571 
(CC). 
49  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 2 SA 571 
(CC) para 223. 
50  Kurland 1959 Utah L Rev 457. 
51  Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2018 2 SA 571 
(CC) para 235 
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In essence therefore, Mogoeng Mogoeng's reasoning serves to arrest the 
potential risk of judicialisation of politics. Unlike its opposite - the 
politicisation of the judiciary, judicialisation of politics said to occurs when 
"the Court [assumes jurisdiction over] a wide variety of policy processes that 
would otherwise be the responsibility of the executive and legislature, that 
is, the majoritarian institutions".52 It is also characterized by a rising reliance 
"on judicial bodies and processes … the reliance on courts and judicial 
processes to address 'core moral predicaments, public policy questions, 
and political controversies' and 'matters of outright and utmost political 
significance that often define and divide whole polities".53 
Nonetheless, it is worth pointing out that in most cases the public has 
generally defended the judiciary and endeavours to demean the judiciary 
have not gone without censure and adverse publicity.54 Sympathy for the 
courts seems to be premised on the recognition that 
… the jurisdiction of the courts must be jealously guarded if only for the reason 
that the beginning of dictatorships in many parts of the world had often 
commences with usurpations of authority of Courts and many dictators were 
often known to become restive under the procedural and structural safeguards 
employed by the Courts for the purpose of enhancing the rule of law and 
preserving the personal and propriety rights of individuals.55 
Much as that might be so, expecting that tension to be eliminated would be 
idealistic.56 The consolation however, is that such antagonism can be 
reduced especially if the Executive and the judiciary both appreciate "that 
each has a role to perform and that each is better equipped to carry it out 
than the other ... that they are there to serve the people, not their own ends, 
and to adapt their conduct accordingly".57 
Besides the risk of delegitimizing the judiciary, the government's anti-judicial 
review approach could have far-reaching consequences that undermine not 
just the authority of the courts but the economy as well.58 This is already a 
                                            
52  Tate 1994 Int'l Pol Sci Rev 190. 
53  Ciencia "From Judicialization to Politicization of the Judiciary" 118. 
54  See Van Zyl 2009 PELJ 2. See also Mattes et al 2003 
http://www.afrobarometer.org/publications/wp24-democratic-governance-south-
africa-peoples-view 2. 
55  Aniagolu JSC in Oba Lamidi Adeyemi (Alafin of Oyo) & Ors v Attorney General of 
Oyo State & Ors 1984 1 SCNLR 525 602. See also Malila 2011 Zambia LJ 70.  
56  McHugh 2002 http://www.hcourt.gov.au/assets/publications/speeches/former-
justices/mchughj/mchughj_paris.htm. 
57  Pearce 1991 PLR 193. 
58  It has been shown that there is a link between judicial independence and economic 
freedom or growth. See generally Epstein Economics of Judicial Behaviour; World 
Bank date unknown http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTIN 
ST/Resources/JudicialIndependence.pdf. In the South African context, it is reported 
that one of the considerations taken into account in averting a sovereign rating 
downgrade was the strength and independence of institutions such as the judiciary. 
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problem, especially in light of the fact that the highest, the Constitutional 
Court enjoys "relatively low legitimacy, at least as compared to other high 
courts; its legitimacy varies across racial groups; and most important, that 
the Constitutional Court is able to convert its legitimacy into acquiescence 
only in some circumstances and only with some groups".59 Furthermore, the 
government's public statements might champion a perception that the 
judiciary is counter-majoritarian and partial. This might inter alia give 
ammunition to the government to interference in the appointment of judges. 
Emphasis would end up being put for instance, on ideological 
considerations when appointing judges which would result in a partisan 
bench. 
It is probably in recognition of this sticky situation as well as the conundrums 
that come with the vilification of the courts that it was deemed necessary for 
the judiciary and the Executive to meet "to discuss matters of concern to the 
Judiciary. These included public utterances attributed to, among others, 
some members of the National Executive".60 This culminated in a with a "10-
point" agreement from which the executive and the judiciary agreed to 
cultivate mutual respect between each other.61 This is change of tone 
undoubtedly borrows from the understanding that "[w]hat we require if we 
are to move forward is an account that presents the legal and political 
constitutions not as competitors but as partners".62 However, judging by 
experience in other jurisdictions, such a resolution is imbued with 
skepticism. "The idea of a partnership may well provide a basis for the future 
relationship, but it would be unrealistic to expect it to be a partnership 
without tension."63 Added to that option, there should be a "model of 
                                            
See for instance Fin24 2016 https://www.fin24.com/Economy/sa-not-out-of-the-
woods-on-ratings-downgrade-20160509; Joffe 2016 https://www.business 
live.co.za/bd/opinion/2016-12-07-institutional-strength-staved-off-junk-status-
downgrade-by-ratings-agencies/. 
59  Gibson and Caldeira 2003 Journal of Politics 3. See also Hoexter 2000 SALJ 470; 
Daniels date unknown http://law.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=6279&context=expresso; Hoexter Administrative Law; Corder, Jagwanth and 
Soltau 1999 http://www.casac.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Report-on-
Parliamentary-Oversight-and-Accountability.pdf; Pieterse 2004 SAJHR 388. 
60  South African Judiciary 2015 http://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/news/press-
statements/statements-2015?start=20. 
61  After the meeting, President Zuma read Zuma read out the following press 
statement: "The meeting agreed on the following: 1) our respect for the separation 
of powers and the integrity of the two institutions [executive and judiciary] 2) to 
exercise care and caution with regards to public statements and pronouncements 
criticising one another. Failure to do so will undermine the global status of the 
republic as a bastion of democracy, tolerance, human rights and the rule of law". 
South African Judiciary 2015 http://www.judiciary.org.za/index.php/news/press-
statements/statements-2015?start=20. 
62  Hickman 2005 U Toronto LJ 1016. 
63  House of Lords 2007 https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ 
ld200607/ldselect/ldconst/151/151.pdf 68. 
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separated powers that acknowledges the significance of both elements and 
identifies their proper place in a legitimate government structure".64 
4  Conclusion 
The foregoing examination of context-specific political attitudes toward 
judicial review is quite revealing. The reality is that for as long as judicial 
review is inherently or rendered political by virtue its intrinsic function - a 
function that extends their role beyond resolving particular legal disputes to 
one that shapes the boundaries of the political65 - fractious relationship 
between the judiciary and the other branches of government will endure. It 
is from this reality that the friction that has characterised the relationship 
between the South African judiciary and the other arms of the State should 
be understood. 
That conflict is indicative or supports the supposition of entrenched political 
and legal constitutionalism. The common thread in the legislature and 
executive's reaction to judicial review decisions is that government 
supremacy is under threat from legal constitutionalism. That conflict 
however, arises more from the political effects of judicial review and not from 
legal reasoning upon which the judgments are based. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that much as those two conflicting 
constitutionalism models have sought to elevate themselves above each 
other, the reality is that "purely legal and purely political constitutionalism 
both miss the very point of a constitution – to mutually reinforce the legal 
and political systems and to protect their differences".66 Fortunately, with 
the increased interactions between the executive and judiciary, it is hoped 
that accounts of hostilities culminating from the perceived judicialisation of 
the political arm can be minimised. That is a worthy start.  
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